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JONES ACT VENUE PROVISIONS SUPERSEDE THOSE OF FEDERAL EMPLOYERS' 
LIABILITY ACT. 
The venue provisions of section 6 of the FELA, which are protected by section 5 of 
the FELA, do not apply to Jones Act cases, since the Jones Act's own venue 
provisions supersede those of the FELA. 
Dextel Terrebonne v. K-Sea Transportation Corp. 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
477 F . 3d 271 
(Decided January 26, 2007) 
In November 2000, appellant Dextel Terrebonne, worked for appellee K-Sea Transportation 
Corp. ("K-Sea"), as a crewmember aboard its tug MARYLAND. On November 3, Terrebonne suffered 
injuries as a result of overexerting himself while lifting a pump in the tug's port propeller shaft 
alleyway. He was diagnosed with a left inguinal hernia, and underwent hernia repair surgery on 
December 11, 2000. On March 12, 2001, Terrebonne and K-Sea, while in New York, executed a 
written "Partial Release and Claims Arbitration Agreement" whereby Terrebonne reserved the right to 
seek recovery for damages that might develop after the date of the agreement that are related to the 
alleged incident, but agreed to arbitrate any such future claims in New York. 1 Additionally, Terrebonne 
agreed to "submit any claims related to the alleged incident . . .  for damages that develop after the date 
of [the] agreement, arising under the theory of unseaworthiness, Jones Act . . .  to arbitration in New 
York pursuant to the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association (AAA)."2 
Terrebonne reported a recurrence of his prior hernia on April 26 or 27, 2001, while working on the tug. 
Terrebonne instituted this action against K-Sea in which he demanded a trial by jury alleging that 
it was filed under the Jones Act,3 to recover damages for negligence, and under General Admiralty and 
Maritime Law for unseaworthiness, maintenance, care and wages. The complaint next alleged that K­
Sea' s acts caused or contributed to Terrebonne' s  injuries. K-Sea moved to stay further proceedings 
pending the completion of the arbitration of Terrebonne's  claims pursuant to the March 12, 2001, 
agreement. Terrebonne opposed this motion arguing that the April 2001 injury was a separate injury 
from his prior hernia. He further argued that the arbitration agreement was unenforceable under section 
1 of the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") since it involved a seaman's  employment contract; and that the 
Jones Act, by virtue of its incorporation of section 5 of the Federal Employers' Liability Act ("FELA"),4 
voided the agreement. The district court granted K -Sea' s motion to compel, reasoning that the March 
12, 2001 agreement was "clearly separate and independent from Terrebonne's  employment contract" 
and that Terrebonne' s  FELA-based argument was unsupported by case law and further undermined by 
the fact that the agreement did not exempt K-Sea from liability. 5 Terrebonne then agreed to an 
arbitration hearing whereby the panel dismissed all of his claims, but awarded him arbitration costs in 
the amount of $9,12 3 to be paid by K-Sea. On August 5, 2005, K-Sea moved to reopen and dismiss the 
lawsuit with prejudice. Terrebonne filed an opposition to K-Sea's motion on August 12, 2005, and 
further moved to set aside the district court's order, arguing that the agreement violated FELA § 5. On 
December 15, 2005, the district court granted K-Sea' s motion with prejudice and Terrebonne appealed. 
1 Terrebonne v. K-Sea Transp. Corp., 477 F.3d 27 1 ,  274 (5th Cir. 2007). 
2 !d. at 274. . 
3 46 U.S.C. § 688 (2000) (repealed 2006). 
4 45 U.S.C. § 55 (2000). 
5 Terrebonne, 477 F.3d at 275. 
3 
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit first addressed Terrebonne's 
FAA § 1 claim. Section 1 of the FAA "compels judicial enforcement of a wide range of written 
arbitration agreements." However, the FAA explicitly states that it does not "apply to contracts of 
employment of seamen."6 Terrebonne contended that this exclusion applied to the instant case because 
the March 2001 agreement was subsumed into his employment contract. The Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals disagreed with Terrebonne because prior case law clarified that maintenance and cure is "an 
intrinsic part of the employment relationship, separate from the actual employment contract." 7 
The Court of Appeals next addressed the FELA § 5 claim. "In passing the Jones Act, Congress 
did not specifically enumerate the rights of seamen, but extended to them the same rights granted to 
railway employees." 8 Section 5 of the FELA states that "[a] ny contract, rule, regulation, or device 
whatsoever, the purpose or intent of which shall be to enable any common carrier to exempt itself from 
any liability created by this chapter . . . " is invalid.9 Terrebonne relied on Boyd v. Grand Trunk Western 
R. Co., which held that FELA § 5 voided a railroad worker's settlement agreement and as a result 
excluded that venue provided for in FELA § 6.10  The Court of Appeals was not persuaded by 
Terrebonne's reliance on Boyd because, unlike Boyd, the Jones Act is applicable in the instant case and 
has its own venue provision contained in § 688(a). Therefore, the court concluded that the venue 
requirements under the FELA were not controlling because to hold so would negate the plain language 
of the venue provisions of the Jones Act. After holding that the venue provisions of FELA § 6 are 
inapplicable to Jones Act cases, the court continued to hold that FELA § 5 was equally inapplicable to 
Jones Act disputes. Therefore, the current arbitration agreement was held to be valid. 
Terrebonne then argued that requiring arbitration of a seaman's Jones Act claim is contrary to 
public policy. The court disagreed and noted that the policy of the FAA is to favor arbitration. 
Additionally, while the burden was on Terrebone to show a contrary and compelling public interest, the 
court concluded that he failed to do so. The district court's decision was affirmed. 
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6 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2000). 
7 Terrebonne, 477 F.3d at 279 (quoting Wood v. Diamond M Drilling Co. , 69 1 F.2d 1 1 65, 1 170 (5th Cir. 1 982)). 
8 Jd. at 280 (quoting Withhart v. Otto Candies, L.L. C., 431 F.3d 840, 843 (5th Cir. 2005)). 
9 45 u.s.c. § 55 (2000). 
10 338 U.S. 263 ( 1 949). 
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